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I. INTRODUCTION 
Since the establishment of the European Economic Community in 
the 1960s, company law harmonization has possibly been the area of 
private law most affected by the EEC/EC/EU.1 Historically, EC com-
pany law harmonization had three objectives. First, the Treaty envi-
sioned that that the Council and the Commission would coordinate “to 
the extent that it is necessary and with a view to making them equiva-
lent, the guarantees demanded in Member States from companies […] 
for the purpose of protecting the interests both of the members of such 
companies and of third parties.”2 Parties interacting with community 
firms should therefore be able to rely on a set of “equivalent safe-
guards.”3 Second, the concern that one of the Member States might es-
                                                                                                             
1.  MARCUS LUTTER, WALTER BAYER & JESSICA SCHMIDT, EUROPÄISCHES 
UNTERNEHMENS- UND KAPITALMARKTRECHT § 1 ¶ 2 (5th ed. 2012) (describing company law 
as the area of private law where harmonization has progressed most). 
2.     Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, art. 54(3)(g), 
298 U.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter EEC Treaty]; see also Consolidated Version of the Treaty Estab-
lishing the European Community, art. 44(2)(g), 2006 O.J. C 321 E/37, at 60 (using updated 
language); Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art. 
50(2)(g), 2008 O.J. C 115/47 (using nearly identical language); Mads Andenas, EU Company 
Law and the Company Laws of Europe, 6 INT’L & COMP. CORP. L. J. 7, 9 (2008); Yves 
Guyon, La coordination communautaire du droit français des sociétés, 26 REVUE TRIMES-
TRIELLE DE DROIT EUROPEEN [RTDE] 241, 241, 247 (1990) (Fr.) (finding that contracting par-
ties were the main beneficiaries of harmonization); Walter Hallstein, Angleichung des Privat- 
und Prozessrechts in der Europäischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft, 28 RABELS ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR 
AUSLÄNDISCHES UND INTERNATIONALES PRIVATRECHT [RABELSZ] 211, 212 (1964) (Ger). 
3.   A classic example is the 1st Company Law Directive, which stipulates that that con-
tracts could not be repudiated on grounds of being ultra vires, and limits circumstances under 
which the nullity of a corporation. First Council Directive of 9 March 1968 on co-ordination of 
safeguards which, for the protection of the interests of members and others, are required by 
Member States of companies within the meaning of the second paragraph of Article 58 of the 
Treaty, with a view to making such safeguards equivalent throughout the Community, 1968 O.J. 
L 65/8, art. 9-12 [hereinafter First Council Directive]. The First Council Directive has since been 
recast. See Directive 2009/101/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 Septem-
ber 2009 on coordination of safeguards which, for the protection of the interests of members and 
third parties, are required by Member States of companies within the meaning of the second 
paragraph of Article 48 of the Treaty, with a view to making such safeguards equivalent, 2009 
O.J. L 258/11, arts. 10-13. See also Robert R. Drury, Nullity of Companies, in EUROPEAN 
COMPANY LAWS: A COMPARATIVE APPROACH 247, 250-253 (Robert R. Drury & Peter G. 
Xuereb eds. 1991); R. Houin, Le régime juridique des sociétés dans la Communauté Econo-
mique Européenne, 1 RTDE 11, 14 (1965) 
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tablish itself as a “European Delaware” existed as early as the negotia-
tions for the Treaty of Rome.4 Specifically, already before the acces-
sion of the United Kingdom to the European Communities, it was 
feared that, if given a free choice, founders of corporations would 
choose Dutch law, which was at that time perceived as the most per-
missive system5 and was also the only Member State using the “incor-
poration theory” at the time.6 Timmermans, among others, thus saw 
harmonization as a quid pro quo, i.e. something that Member States 
could expect as compensation for conceding that the Freedom of Es-
tablishment would be extended to companies.7 
Thirdly, EC Company Law harmonization was intended to facili-
tate cross-border amalgamations of firms, given that at the time few 
companies in Europe operated across national borders and did not com-
pare favorably to American firms that operated on a Continental scale.8 
                                                                                                             
4. See Christian W.A. Timmermans, Die europäische Rechtsangleichung im 
Gesellschaftsrecht, 48 RABELSZ 1, 13 (1984) (Ger.). 
5. See Christian W.A. Timmermans, Methods and Tools for Integration. Report, in EURO-
PEAN BUSINESS LAW: LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSES ON INTEGRATION AND HARMONIZA-
TION 129, 132 (Richard M. Buxbaum, Alain Hirsch & Klaus J. Hopt eds.1991) (pointing out 
French fears that the Netherlands might become the Delaware of Europe); Houin, supra note 3, 
at 16 (expressing concerns that companies might be able to opt out of protections for third parties 
by choosing lax laws). 
6. See ERIC STEIN, HARMONIZATION OF EUROPEAN COMPANY LAWS 29-31 (1971); 
Houin, supra note 3, at 22. 
7. Timmermans, Rechtsangleichung, supra note 4, at 12-14; Timmermans, Methods, su-
pra note 5, at 132; see also Alfred F. Conard, The European Alternative to Uniformity in Cor-
poration Laws, 89 MICH. L. REV. 2150, 2190 (1991) (noting that France and Germany required 
“equivalent safeguards” to open their markets to corporations from other member states); Kreši-
mir Piršl, Trends, Developments, and Mutual Influences between United States Corporate 
Law(s) and European Community Company Law(s), 14 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 277, 326 (2008) (de-
scribing harmonization as “price” or “necessary compensation” required by some member states 
to accept freedom of establishment). 
8. GUIDO COLONNA DI PALIANO, COMMUNICATION DE MONSIEUR COLONNA DI PALIANO 
MEMBRE DE LA COMMISSION DE LA COMMUNAUTE ECONOMIQUE EUROPEENNE A LA XVEME 
“TABLE RONDE DES PROBLEMES DE L’EUROPE” SUR LE DROIT DES SOCIETES 3-5 (1965) (It.), 
http://aei.pitt.edu/13639; “Legal Disparities Obstruct Intro-Community Mergers”, EUR. COM. 
BUL., June 1966, nr. 93, at 6-7; Jörn Pipkorn, Zur Entwicklung des europäischen Gesellschafts- 
und Unternehmensrechts, 136 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR DAS GESAMTE HANDELSRECHT UND 
WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT 499, 503 (1972) (Ger.). 
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The success of the harmonization program is, however, contro-
versial. While some have described it as a great success story,9 Luca 
Enriques, one of the most irreverent commentators of EU Company 
Law, has described the harmonization program as “trivial,” meaning 
that it had hardly any impact on the way companies are run, with lim-
ited exceptions, and argued that national company law cultures were 
able to persist.10 
Given the constraints of a symposium contribution, our analysis 
of the impact of UK law on EU company law is necessarily incomplete 
and will emphasize a few key areas. However, we will propose a bifur-
cated thesis in which we distinguish between company law issues re-
lated to capital markets and others. Areas not directly related to capital 
markets that were the subject of the first wave of company law harmo-
nization attempts include board structure and legal capital. Here, the 
United Kingdom had a considerable impact, as it was typically on the 
brakes when Continental Europeans were poised to enact top-down 
regulation along the lines of the German company law model. The 
United Kingdom tended to favor freedom of choice in company law, 
and thus ended up as the primary “user” of the freedom of establish-
ment for companies, which led to the fulfillment of the noble dream of 
this particular Freedom in spite of Continental objections and fears of 
a race to the bottom. 
By contrast, in areas related to capital markets, the UK model be-
came the driving force for harmonization when the issue came on the 
European Union’s radar screen from the 2000s onwards. In areas such 
as takeover law and financial reporting, EU law generally adopted UK 
models emphasizing transparency and shareholder choice, either as 
mandatory law, or as a strongly encouraged model for the Member 
States. However, it is likely that the United Kingdom would have had 
the same impact without being an EU member. Thus, we can say that 
UK membership was ultimately irrelevant for the development of EU 
law. 
This article is structured as follows. In Part II, we discuss the 
United Kingdom’s unique perspective in corporate law and business 
regulation. In Part III, we address the United Kingdom’s role in two 
                                                                                                             
9. E.g. SUSANNE KALSS & CHRISTOPH KLAMPFL, EUROPÄISCHES 
GESELLSCHAFTSRECHT ¶ 1 (2015): (“a great success story of European regulation efforts”); 
Lutter et al., supra note 1, § 1 ¶ 2. 
10. Luca Enriques, EC Company Law Directives and Regulations: How Trivial are They?, 
27 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 1, 7 (2006). 
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traditional areas of company law harmonization, namely the board of 
directors (in the failed 5th Directive and the SE) and legal capital. In 
Part IV, we discuss areas related to capital markets, such as takeover 
law and accounting (which has morphed from a “traditional” to a cap-
ital-market oriented area). Part V provides a conclusion to the preced-
ing analysis. 
II. THE UK’S UNIQUE PERSPECTIVE 
In terms of economic policy and business law, the United King-
dom is often thought to have a very different perspective from the ma-
jority of Continental Europe. Economists espousing the “legal origins” 
theory have emphasized the difference between the common law the 
civil law tradition and proposed that it explains many differences in 
legal rules and regulations in many areas, which consequently have 
considerable economic and social impact.11 
A different literature, the socio-economic theory of different vari-
eties of capitalism, suggests that the UK’s particular perspective might 
be rooted in its adherence to a different “variety of capitalism” than 
much of the rest of the European Union, in particular its strong orien-
tation toward markets, standing in contrast to other Member States that 
fall into a different category. This literature posits that different coun-
tries have developed different packages of socioeconomic and political 
institutions that – by providing a particular set of institutional comple-
mentarities – have helped the respective jurisdiction to be competi-
tive.12 In other words, capitalist institutions do not necessarily have to 
be the same everywhere to make a country economically successful, 
but there are different strategies to achieve economic success.13 Within 
the Western world, this literature distinguishes between market-based 
                                                                                                             
11. Rafeal La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, The Economic Con-
sequences of Legal Origins, 46 J. ECON. LIT. 285 (2008). Many studies in the “legal origins” 
area have been subject to intense critique. See Holger Spamann, Legal Origin, Civil Procedure, 
and the Quality of Contract Enforcement, 166 J. INST. & THEO. ECON. 149 (2010); Holger Spa-
mann, The “Antidirector Rights Index” Revisited, 63 REV. FIN. STUD. 467 (2010). 
12. Orfeo Fioretos, Sources of Multilateral Preferences, in VARIETIES OF CAPITALISM 
213, 228 (Peter A. Hall & David Soskice eds. 2001). 
13. For an application of the theory to law, see CURTIS J. MILHAUPT & KATHARINA PIS-
TOR, LAW & CAPITALISM 36-38, 182-192 (2008). 
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and coordinated capitalist systems. While the former describes a sys-
tem based on individual market transactions, the latter is based on 
large-scale coordination through aggregated interest groups such as un-
ions and employer associations relying on collective bargaining.14 For 
example, specific human capital is thought to be more important in a 
coordinated system, whereas human capital in market-based systems is 
thought to be more transferable.15 
Relatedly, the literature on financial systems distinguishes be-
tween “arm’s length” or “outsider” financial systems on the one hand, 
and “control-oriented” or “insider” financial systems on the other.16 
While in an insider system, firms tend to receive needed finance 
through stock and bond markets, insider systems rely more on bank-
finance as well as large, strategic shareholders.17 This is, again, linked 
to the observation that publicly-traded firms in the United Kingdom, 
somewhat like those in the United States, have a more dispersed own-
ership structure than Continental European countries.18 
This particular perspective informs our subsequent discussion of 
the role of the United Kingdom within UK company law. As the exam-
ples in the following sections will show, we can look at how the UK 
model has (or has not) pushed the European Union toward a greater 
capital-market orientation in the vein of a market-oriented capitalist 
system. EU company law often developed out of the juxtaposition of 
United Kingdom with German company law traditions. These are in-
formed in turn by different styles of capitalism, which are often ex-
pressed in specific company law and corporate governance institutions. 
                                                                                                             
14. RICHARD W. CARNEY, CONTESTED CAPITALISM 3 (2010); Peter A. Hall & David 
Soskice, An Introduction to Varieties of Capitalism, in VARIETIES OF CAPITALISM, supra note 
12, at 1, 8-9. 
15. E.g. Margariata Estevez-Abe, Torben Iversen & David Soskice, Social Protection and 
the Formation of Skills: A Reinterpretation of the Welfare State, in VARIETIES OF CAPITALISM, 
supra note 12, at 145, 146-147, 154. 
16. See Erik Berglöf, A Note on the Typology of Financial Systems, in COMPARATIVE 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 151, 159-164 (Klaus J. Hopt & Eddy Wymeersch eds. 1997); ALAN 
DIGNAM & MICHAEL GALANIS, THE GLOBALIZATION OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 43-44 
(2009). 
17. See id. 
18. E.g. Marco Becht & Alisa Roëll, Blockholdings in Europe: An International 
Comparison, 43 EUR. ECON. REV. 1049 (1999); Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & 
Andrei Shleifer, Corporate Ownership Around the World, 54 J. OF FIN. 471-517 (1999). 
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For example, the United Kingdom and Germany are often considered 
to differ greatly in the question of the fundamental orientation of com-
pany law. The typical belief is that the United Kingdom is strongly 
committed to the maximization of the welfare of shareholders; by con-
trast, German corporate law is typically thought to pursue wider objec-
tive that caters to the interests of a broader spectrum of “stakeholders.” 
One major example is of course German codetermination, i.e. the rep-
resentation of employees on the supervisory board.19 Another differ-
ence, which belabored without limits in the comparative corporate gov-
ernance literature, is of course different ownerships structures. While 
the United Kingdom has long been characterized by dispersed owner-
ship mainly by institutional investors, Germany and other Continental 
European countries traditionally exhibit more concentrated forms of 
share ownership. 
Thus, the entrenched interests dominating the national position in 
positions in European negotiations reflect the prevailing powers, which 
are more often institutional investors in the United Kingdom, and labor 
interests, blockholders, and a multiplicity of other players on the Con-
tinent.20 Consequently, the United Kingdom has tended to oppose man-
datory substantive regulation of corporate law intended to protect cred-
itors and employees in particular. The UK model has, however, been 
congenial with a vision of more transparency and freedom of contract 
that informed shareholders operating in an arm’s length market could 
use. 
                                                                                                             
19. See Martin Gelter, Comparative Corporate Governance: Old and New, in UNDER-
STANDING THE COMPANY: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND THEORY 37, 42-44 (Barnali 
Choudhury & Martin Petrin eds. 2017). 
20. See also John Armour & Wolf-Georg Ringe, European Company Law 1999-2010: 
Renaissance and Crisis, 48 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 125, 128-129 (2010) (suggesting that dif-
ferent entrenched interests explain resistance to harmonization efforts). 
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III. BOARD STRUCTURE AND CAPITAL STRUCTURE: THE UK 
AS AN IMPEDIMENT TO HARMONIZATION 
A. The Boards of Directors: The 5th Directive and the European 
Company Statute 
Over the course of several decades, the EC toyed with the possi-
bility of harmonizing the organization structure of public companies. 
This project had two aspects. First, starting in 195921 academics had 
vented the plan to pass a European Company Statute,22 which would 
provide a unitary legal form for public companies across Member 
States, and would provide an option available everywhere in addition 
to the public company under the respective State’s law. The first at-
tempts were followed by a Proposal for a regulation in 1970 and an 
amended Proposal in 1975.23 The European Company Statute was 
passed in 2001,24 and since then the Societas Europaea (“SE”) has been 
available as an additional legal form throughout the European Union, 
even if it is used mainly in particular Member States.25 
Second, the original harmonization plan for company law also in-
cluded a 5th Directive or “Structure Directive” that would have man-
dated a particular board structure, and a distribution of competences 
between different corporate bodies. A draft for this Directive, which 
also addressed the powers and obligations of corporate bodies, was first 
                                                                                                             
21. The French Government proposed the creation of a European stock corporation to the 
Council of Ministers in 1965. In 1975, an amended proposal for a regulation was presented. See 
RICHARD M. BUXBAUM & KLAUS J. HOPT, LEGAL HARMONIZATION AND THE BUSINESS EN-
TERPRISE 244 (1988). 
22. Pieter Sanders, Vers une société anonyme européenne? 1959 RIVISTA DELLE SOCIETÀ 
1163-1176. See for the History of the discussion Johan de Bruycker, EC Company Law - The 
European Company v. The European Economic Interest Grouping and the Harmonization of the 
National Company Laws, 21 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 191 199 et seq. (1991). For an early state-
ment from an EEC commissioner, see COLONNA DI PALIANO, supra note 8, at 9. 
23. Caspar Rose, The New Corporate Vehicle Societas Europaea (SE): consequences for 
European corporate governance, 15 CORP. GOV. 112, 113 (2007) (“Both drafts were heavily 
influenced by the German Company law legislation, which was considered somehow problem-
atic from the perspective of some of the member states.”) 
24. Council Regulation (EC) No 2157/2001 of 8 October 2001 on the Statute for a Euro-
pean company (SE), 2001 O.J. L 294/1. 
25. See Horst Eidenmüller, Andreas Engert & Lars Hornuf, Incorporating under European 
Law: The Societas Europaea as a Vehicle for Legal Arbitrage, 10 EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 1 
(2009). 
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proposed in 197226, amended in 198327 and again in 1990.28 It never 
came into being and the third draft was ultimately withdrawn by the 
Commission in 2001.29 A few aspects of the 5th Directive were incor-
porated in the Shareholder Rights Directive of 200730 and the new Au-
dit Directive of 2014.31 
The first drafts for the SE and the 5th Directive32 were rigidly Ger-
manic in their approach. In particular, they required a two-tier board 
structure (consisting of a management and supervisory board) and em-
ployee representation modeled on German codetermination. Among 
the original Member States besides Germany, the Netherlands required 
employee participation, but not France and Italy.33 The two-tier board 
structure has been available as an option in France since 1966, but 
                                                                                                             
26. Commission of the European Communities, Proposal for a Fifth Directive to coordi-
nate the safeguards which, for the protection of the interests of members and others, are required 
by Member States of companies within the meaning of the second paragraph of Article 58 of the 
Treaty, as regards the structure of sociétés anonymes and the powers and obligations of their 
organs, COM (72) 887 final, (Oct. 1972) [hereinafter Fifth Directive First Draft]. 
27. Commission of the European Communities, Amended Proposal for a Fifth Directive 
Founded on Article 54(3)(g) of the EEC Treaty Concerning the Structure of Public Limited 
Companies and the Powers and Obligations of their Organs, COM (83) 185 final (Aug. 1983) 
[hereinafter Fifth Directive Second Draft]. 
28. Second Amendment to the Proposal for a Fifth Council Directive Based on Article 54 
of the EEC Treaty Concerning the Structure of Public Limited Companies and the Powers and 
Obligations of their Organs, COM (90) 629 final (Dec. 1990) [hereinafter Fifth Directive Third 
Draft]. 
29. Communication from the Commission, Withdrawal of Commission Proposals which 
are no longer topical, COM (2001) 763 final (Dec. 2001) [hereinafter Fifth Directive With-
drawal]. 
30. Directive 2007/36/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 July 2007 
on the exercise of certain rights of shareholders in listed companies, 2007 O.J. L 184/17. 
31. See Directive 2014/56/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 
2014 amending Directive 2006/43/EC on statutory audits of annual accounts and consolidated 
accounts, 2014 O.J. L 158/196, art. 37 (requiring a shareholder vote for the appointment of the 
auditor). 
32. The first draft of the Fifth Company Law Directive was issued in 1972. Fifth Directive 
First Draft, supra note 25. The second draft was issued in 1983. Fifth Directive Second Draft, 
supra note 26. The third and final draft was issued in 1990. Fifth Directive Third Draft, supra 
note 27. The Proposal was officially withdrawn by the Commission in 2001. Fifth Directive 
Withdrawal, supra note 28.  
33. See Klaus J. Hopt, Labor Representation on Corporate Boards: Impacts and Problems 
for Corporate Governance and Economic Integration in Europe, 14 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 203, 
204-205 (1994). 
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never became particularly popular.34 Thus, the requirement of a Ger-
man-style board structure for the entire Community may have been a 
doomed project from the very beginning. 
With the accession of the United Kingdom in 1973, the one-tier 
faction was further strengthened. The United Kingdom in fact toyed 
with the idea of employee participation during the 1970s, when a La-
bour government commissioned the “Bullock Report”, which recom-
mended an employee participation system modeled on German and 
Swedish law.35 However, since the unions were lackluster about the 
prospect of sitting on boards, the project already lay dormant when 
Margaret Thatcher came into power in 1980.36 Subsequently, British 
support for labor representation was unthinkable. 
The SE was passed only as a watered-down compromise in 2001, 
which required Member States to permit a choice between one-tier and 
two-tier boards and set up a complex negotiation mechanism for em-
ployee representation in merged companies.37 In this case, the third 
goal of company law harmonization – facilitating cross-border business 
combination – thus prevailed over the first two – creating minimum 
standards and preventing regulatory arbitrage. In the end, the SE might 
have been enacted earlier if the United Kingdom had not been an 
EC/EU member, and the 5th Directive might at least have been within 
the realm of realistic possibilities without UK membership, given that 
the United Kingdom supported the third goal, but not former two with 
respect to this aspect of company law. The resistance particularly 
against employee participation seems to have been the main reason for 
                                                                                                             
34. Klaus J Hopt & Patrick Leyens, Board Models in Europe – Recent Developments of 
Internal Corporate Governance Structures in Germany, the United Kingdom, France, and Italy, 
2004 EUR. COMP. & FIN. L. REV. 135, 156. 
35. LORD ALAN BULLOCK, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF INQUIRY ON INDUSTRIAL DE-
MOCRACY (1977); see generally Walter Kolvenbach, EEC Company Law Harmonization and 
Worker Participation, 11 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 709 (1990) (discussing employee participation across 
Europe). 
36. See K.W. WEDDERBURN, THE WORKER AND THE LAW 837 (3d ed. 1986); David 
Marsh & Gareth Locksley, Capital in Britain: Its Structural Power and Influence Over Policy, 
W. EUR. POL., Mar. 1983, at 36, 50. 
37.  Interestingly, the SE is used mainly in jurisdictions that have laws requiring employee 
representation on corporate boards. See Eidenmüller et al., supra note 24. 
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the failure the 5th Directive.38 Still, with Brexit looming, we should not 
expect EU lawmaking on either issue in the coming years. 
It is interesting to note, however, that employee participation 
seems to be on the ascendancy again. During the high period of “con-
vergence in corporate governance” toward an “end of history for cor-
porate law” characterized by shareholder wealth maximization it was 
considered a vestige from the bad old days.39 The increased economic 
protectionism of recent years seems to have brought it back. On the one 
hand, France, a longstanding abstainer from the practice, introduced a 
moderate form of it in 2013, although the effects and impact are not yet 
clear. On the other hand the Czech Republic passed a law in March 
2012 allowing companies to instate a one-tier board structure and abol-
ished the existing law on codetermination.40 The United Kingdom, 
which was its most fervent opponent during the 1980s throughout the 
2000s, seems to be considering it again, as noticed in the recent Green 
Paper on Company Law, which was published in 2016 in the wake of 
the Brexit referendum.41 
It would be almost ironic if a future UK government were to in-
troduce some form of employee participation. This would constitute 
what one could call a “Roe moment.” Mark Roe, in an influential body 
of scholarship, suggested that pro-employee mechanisms that distract 
from shareholder orientation typically need to be introduced for an 
economy to get back on the tracks in times of social upheaval. “Before 
a society can produce, it must achieve social peace.”42 Brexit, which 
                                                                                                             
38. See Janet Dine, Implications for the United Kingdom of the EC Fifth Directive, 38 
INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 547 (1989); Daniel T. Murphy, The Amended Proposal for a Fifth Company 
Law Directive—Nihil Novum, 7 HOUS. J. INT’L. L. 215 (1984); Steven Schneebaum, The Com-
pany Law Harmonization Program of the European Community,14 L. & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 293, 
308-317 (1982); J. Temple Lang, The Fifth Directive on the Harmonization of Company Law, 
12 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 345 (1975). 
39. Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 
GEO. L. J. 439 (2001). 
40. In January 2017, the Czech Commercial Code was amended to re-assert obligatory 
representation of employees on supervisory boards, but only for joint-stock companies with 
more than 500 employees. On the development of Czech law, see Jan Lasák, With Love from the 
Heart of Europe: New Rules for Czech Joint-Stock Companies, 18 EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 85, 
93 (2017). 
41. DEPARTMENT FOR BUSINESS, ENERGY & INDUSTRIAL STRATEGY, CORPORATE GOV-
ERNANCE REFORM, 2016 (UK). 
42. MARK J. ROE, POLITICAL DETERMINANTS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 1 (2003). 
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may entail a severe reorientation of the British economy, create a situ-
ation where a readjusted social compact is required for the country to 
move forward. 
B. Legal capital and the freedom of establishment: A transient 
victory 
Another area in which the United Kingdom had a considerable 
impact was – rather indirectly than directly – legal capital, whose de-
velopment is linked to the freedom of establishment for companies. As 
part of the original company law harmonization program, the 2nd Di-
rective43 established a system of minimum capital requirements (set at 
EUR 25,000) as well as capital maintenance rules for public compa-
nies. At least on much of the Continent, the legal capital regime was 
long considered a cornerstone of the law of corporations that was ab-
solutely necessary to protect creditors, and to allow companies to op-
erate across borders within the internal market. Still, in open contradic-
tion to this idea, the 2nd Directive applied only to public companies and 
was never extended to private ones. Some Member States, such as the 
United Kingdom, Ireland and the Netherlands, only created a clear dis-
tinction between private and public companies arguably in order to 
limit the application of the Directive.44 Before the implementation of 
the Directive in the United Kingdom, Ireland and the Netherlands, 
these two types of limited liability companies were not considered 
                                                                                                             
43. Second Council Directive 77/91/EEC of 13 December 1976 on Coordination of Safe-
guards Which, for the Protection of the Interests of  Members and Others, are Required by Mem-
ber States of Companies within the Meaning of the Second Paragraph if Article 58 of the Treaty, 
in Respect of the Formation of Public Limited Companies and the Maintenance and Alteration 
of their Capital, with a View to Making Such Safeguards Equivalent, 1977 O.J. L 26/1 [herein-
after Second Directive]. The Directive was recodified in 2012. See Directive 2012/30/EU of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2012 on Coordination of Safeguards 
Which, for the Protection of the Interests of Members and Others, are Required by Member 
States of Companies Within the Meaning of the Second Paragraph of Article 54 of the Treaty 
on the Functioning of the European Union, in Respect of the Formation of Public Limited Lia-
bility Companies and the Maintenance and Alteration of Their Capital, with a View to Making 
such Safeguards Equivalent, 2012 O.J. L 315/74 [hereinafter Directive 2012/30/EU]. 
44. See VANESSA EDWARDS, EC COMPANY LAW 53 (1999); STEFAN GRUNDMANN, EU-
ROPEAN COMPANY LAW 207 (2nd ed. 2012); DEPARTMENT OF TRADE, IMPLEMENTATION OF 
THE SECOND EEC DIRECTIVE ON COMPANY LAW 6 (1977) (discussing the directive’s require-
ment of separate designations for public and private companies); Clive M. Schmitthoff, The Sec-
ond EEC Directive on Company Law, 15 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 43, 45-46 (1978). 
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clearly distinct as legal forms.45 Most Member States initially had a 
similar legal capital system (including minimum capital) in place for 
both types of firms, without being explicitly required to do so. How-
ever, while retaining a legal capital system in principle, the United 
Kingdom never introduced a minimum capital for private limited com-
panies. 
The Commission presented the Proposal for the 2nd Directive in 
197046, but due to the accession of the United Kingdom, Ireland and 
Denmark, the Directive was not adopted until 1976 in light of the new 
Members request for changes. It has to be pointed out that the draft of 
the 2nd Directive was in part – and in comparison to the 1st Directive – 
considerably influenced by British and Irish company law experts. Es-
pecially in regards to the provisions concerning financial aid for a com-
pany wanting to purchase its own shares (Art 23) and redemption of 
shares (Art 39), the European instrument mirrors existing UK legisla-
tion (Companies Act 1948).47 
An extension to private limited companies was contemplated dur-
ing the preparation of the Directive in 1970,48 and the commission for-
mally studied the issue in 1993.49 German scholars, not surprisingly, 
                                                                                                             
45. For the United Kingdom, compare Companies Act 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6 c. 38, § 28(1) 
(defining those companies as “private” that fulfill certain criteria in their articles and leaving 
public companies as the residual category) with COMPANIES ACT 1985, c. 6, § 1(3) and COM-
PANIES ACT 2006, c. 46 § 4(2) (both defining public companies as those identified as public 
companies in the articles and having been founded as public companies under the special re-
quirements of the act). See Paul Davies, The Legal Capital in Private Companies in Great Brit-
ain, 43 DIE AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT 346, 346 (1998) (noting that under the 1985 Act the two 
legal forms are clearly distinct); GRUNDMANN, supra note 43, at 40; see also Clive M. 
Schmitthoff, New Concepts in Company Law, 1973 J. BUS. L. 312, 313-316 (discussing how the 
European directives will necessitate a reform of British law). 
46. Proposition d'une deuxième directive du Conseil tendant à coordonner, en vue de les 
rendre équivalentes, les garanties qui sont exigées, dans les États membres, des sociétés au sens 
de l'article 58 alinéa 2 du traité pour protéger les intérêts tant des associés que des tiers en ce qui 
concerne la constitution de la société anonyme ainsi que le maintien et les modifications de son 
capital, 1970 O.J. C 48/5 (Fr.), http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=OJ:C:1970: 
048:TOC. 
47. See EDWARDS, supra note 43, at 51. 
48. See GRUNDMANN, supra note 43, at 208. 
49. COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, STUDY ON SECOND DIRECTIVE’S 
EXTENSION TO OTHER TYPES OF COMPANIES (1993); see also BODEN DE BANDT DE BRAUW 
JEANTET & URIA, REPORT ON POSSIBLE EXTENSION OF THE SECOND COMPANY LAW DI-
RECTIVE TO PRIVATE LIMITED COMPANIES AND LIMITED PARTNERSHIPS WITH SHARES (1992). 
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often criticized the inconsistency and argued for the extension.50 The 
gap in coverage was probably the primary reason why many Continen-
tal Member States were reluctant to give up the “real seat theory” in the 
conflict of laws treatment of foreign corporations, thus effectively forc-
ing individuals doing business in one Member State to use the company 
forms of that state.51 This open subversion of the freedom of establish-
ment for companies lasted until the Centros-Überseering-Inspire Art 
triad of cases between 1999 and 2003.52 After Inspire Art, however, 
English Private Limited Companies began to flood at least some parts 
of the Continent for a few years. The number of pseudo-English firms 
decreased both in Germany and Austria in 2006, most likely precipi-
tated by certain changes in the application of English law. The most 
important reason appears to have been that the Companies House began 
to strike companies from the register that failed to submit financial 
statements twice.53 However, in recent years the number of pseudo-
English firms has seemingly started to increase again.54 
Even if the jurisdiction within the United Kingdom called “Eng-
land and Wales” did not establish itself as the European Delaware, it 
was instrumental for bringing about changes in the company law of 
other Member States: A number of them began to tweak their laws to 
salvage the attractiveness of their own corporate forms and engaged in 
what is now known as “defensive regulatory competition.”55 Most con-
spicuously, even in the early 2000s a number of Member States began 
                                                                                                             
50. See EDWARDS, supra note 43, at 54-55; GRUNDMANN, supra note 28, at 208; 
Marcus Lutter, A Mini-Directive on Legal Capital, in THE EUROPEAN PRIVATE COMPANY? 201, 
207 (Harm-Jan De Kluiver & Walter Van Gerven eds. 1995). 
51. Under the real seat theory, a corporation must be incorporated in the jurisdiction where 
its “real seat” is located to ensure its legal personality is recognized. See, e.g. CARSTEN GERNER-
BEUERLE, ET AL., STUDY ON THE LAW APPLICABLE TO COMPANIES 27-28 (2016). 
52. Martin Gelter, Centros, the Freedom of Establishment for Companies, and the Court’s 
Accidental Vision for Corporate Law, in EU LAW STORIES 309, 322-30 (Fernanda Nicola & Bill 
Davies eds., 2017). 
53. Wolf-Georg Ringe, Corporate Mobility in the European Union – a Flash in the Pan? 
An empirical study on the success of lawmaking and regulatory competition, 2013 EUR. COMP. 
& FIN. L. REV. 230, 262. 
54. GERNER-BEUERLE ET AL., supra note 50, at 51. 
55. Luca Enriques & Martin Gelter, How the Old World Encountered the New One: Reg-
ulatory Competition and Cooperation in European Corporate and Bankruptcy Law, 81 TUL. L. 
REV. 577, 589-590 (2007); Ringe, supra note 52, at 243-44. 
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to establish private company forms without a minimum capital.56 Even 
without actively attempting to attract foreign incorporations, the com-
bination of the UK’s liberal approach toward legal capital with the Eu-
ropean case law thus had a transformative impact on the law of private 
companies elsewhere. 
In this context, it is interesting to note that the UK approach to 
private companies cannot be described as entirely deregulatory across 
the board: The United Kingdom did not traditionally give as much 
weight to legal capital, which some of the continentals often saw as the 
price of limited liability. In the English perspective, accounting disclo-
sure (rather than) legal capital is seen as the “price” for limited liabil-
ity.57 The 1st Directive has required the disclosure of financial infor-
mation of all limited liability entities since 1968.58 This requirement 
faced considerable resistance specifically in Germany, which seems to 
have come to compliance only in recent years.59 The United Kingdom 
became an EC member only in 1973 and hardly made any changes in 
their respective national law in regard to the disclosure provisions of 
the Directive as the Companies Act of 1967 exceeded and therefore 
complied with the standards set out in the Directive.60 British serious-
ness in enforcing the requirement against companies incorporated in 
                                                                                                             
56. E.g. Eva-Maria Kieninger, The Legal Framework of Regulatory Competition Based on 
Company Mobility: EU and US Compared, 6 GERMAN L.J. 741, 768-770 (2004); Enriques & 
Gelter, supra note 54, at 600-602. 
57. On the idea of publicity as a price or collateral for limited liability, see EDWARDS, 
supra note 43, at 123 n. 41; Jonathan Rickford, Fundamentals, Developments and Trends in 
British Company Law–Some Wider Reflections, 2004 EUR. COMP. & FIN. L. REV. 391, 408; 
Wolfgang Schön, Corporate Disclosure in a Competitive Environment—The Quest for a Euro-
pean Framework on Mandatory Disclosure, 6 J. CORP. L. STUD. 259, 264 (2006). 
58. First Council Directive, supra note 3, at Art 2(1)(f). 
59. On resistance against mandatory disclosure, see EDWARDS, supra note 43, at 22-23; 
Enriques, supra note 10, at 14; Schön, supra note 54, at 260-262. The ECJ found that German 
law did not effectively implement European disclosure requirements. See Verband deutscher 
Daihatsu-Händler eV v. Daihatsu Deutschland GmbH, Case C-97/96, [1997] E.C.R. I-6843; 
Commission v. Germany, Case C-191/95, [1998] E.C.R. I-5449. Moreover, in another case aris-
ing out of Germany, the court dismissed the argument that company disclosure of financial in-
formation constituted a violation of fundamental rights. See Axel Springer AG v Zeitungsverlag 
Niederrhein GmbH & Co. Essen KG & Hans-Jürgen Weske, Joined Cases C-435/02 & 103/03, 
[2004] E.C.R. I-8667. 
60. The First Directive was applicable in Great Britain not upon entry in the EEC but six 
months later, to allow enough time to adjust the British legal provisions only in regard to the 
Directives second topic, namely the validity of commitments made on behalf of the company. 
1428 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 40:5 
England and Wales was apparently a major factor why it did not ulti-
mately become a haven for pseudo-foreign incorporations. 
IV. CAPITAL MARKET ORIENTATION 
A. Takeovers: UK takeover regulation as a soft unifying force 
Let us now turn at a model where the United Kingdom took the 
lead, namely takeover law. By and large, in comparative corporate law, 
we can identify the United States and the United Kingdom as two polar 
opposite lead jurisdictions. They contrast mainly in two points, namely 
the issue of whether boards may defend against hostile bids, and 
whether a “market rule” or “equal opportunity rule” applies. First, in 
most situations, boards of directors in the United States can defend 
against takeovers as long as defenses satisfy the proportionality test set 
up in Unocal v. Mesa Petroleum Co.61 By contrast, UK takeover law, 
which was developed not by the courts but by the originally private 
Panel on Mergers of Takeovers in the so-called City Code, has since 
1968 required that management refrains from “any action that may re-
sult in any offer or bona fide possible offer being frustrated or in share-
holders being denied the opportunity to decide on its merits.”62 The 
only thing directors in the United Kingdom are legitimately allowed to 
do is try to persuade shareholders not to trade into the tender offer. This 
legal principle is known as the “non-frustration rule”, “passivity rule”, 
or “neutrality rule.”63 
Second, takeover law in the United States differs from that in the 
United Kingdom in the fact that so-called market rule applies, meaning 
                                                                                                             
Hans Claudius Ficker, The EEC Directives on Company Law Harmonisation, in THE HARMO-
NISATION OF EUROPEAN COMPANY LAW 66, 72, 75 (Clive M. Schmitthoff ed., 1973). 
61. 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985). 
62. PANEL ON TAKEOVERS AND MERGERS, THE CITY CODE ON TAKEOVERS AND MER-
GERS, at R. 21.1(a) (8th. Ed. 2006). Before the 2006 amendments to the Code, this general clause 
was not part of Rule 21, but General Principle 7 of the Code. For a discussion of these amend-
ments, see Geoffrey K. Morse, Proposed Amendments to the Takeovers Code to Implement the 
13th EC Directive, 2006 J. BUS. L. 242 (2006); see also John Armour & David A. Skeel, Jr., 
Who Writes the Rules for Hostile Takeovers, and Why?—The Peculiar Divergence of U.S. and 
U.K. Takeover Regulation, 95 GEO. L. J. 1727, 1760 (2007) (discussing the historical context of 
the enactment of the Takeover Code). 
63. See, e.g. Matteo Gatti, Optionality Arrangements and Reciprocity in the European 
Takeover Directive, 5 EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 553, 555-57 (2005). 
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that the acquisition of control does not trigger any particular duties of 
the buyer. By contrast, in situations of acquisition of control, the United 
Kingdom applies something like an “equal opportunity” rule, meaning 
that the acquirer must offer non-connected shareholders to buy out their 
shares at the same price that was previously paid during a reference 
period prior to acquiring control.64 This so-called “mandatory bid” im-
plies that anyone acquiring control over a publicly traded firm must 
make an offer to buy out the remaining shareholders at the same price 
as paid prior to the acquisition of a controlling block.65 
Overall, the United Kingdom has been more successful in export-
ing its model to the rest of the world, including to the European Un-
ion.66 Admittedly, the United Kingdom did not explicitly push for a 
takeover law modeled on the City Code. In fact, many in the United 
Kingdom were not too enthusiastic about subjecting the privately orga-
nized takeover panel to a statutory basis.67 Moreover, European takeo-
ver law was a top-down project that the commission – with a view to-
ward creating a more coherent capital market – had pursued since the 
1970s.68 However, the City Code was the main model for the 13th Com-
pany Law Directive (or Takeover Directive)69, which replicates some 
of its rules and structure. The European Court of Justice’s (ECJ’s) case 
                                                                                                             
64. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Efficient and Inefficient Sales of Control, 109 Q. J. ECON. 
957 (1994). 
65. E.g. Armour & Skeel, supra note 62, at 1734-38. 
66. See John Armour, Jack B. Jacobs & Curtis Milhaupt, The Evolution of Hostile Takeo-
ver Regimes in Developed and Emerging Markets: An Analytical Framework, 52 HARV. INT’L 
L. J. 221, 280 (2011) (noting that in several emerging economies “the overall scheme of these 
regimes ostensibly follows global ‘best practices’ modeled on the U.K. Takeover Code,” which 
catering to local vested interests). 
67. See Blanaid Clarke, Takeover Regulation– through the Regulatory Looking Glass, 8 
GER. L. J. 381, 384 (2007). 
68. See Klaus J. Hopt, Takeover regulation in Europe — The battle for the 13th directive 
on takeovers, 15 AUSTL. J. CORP. L. 1, 8-9 (2002) (surveying the history and prehistory of the 
Takeover Directive). 
69. Directive 2004/25/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 
on takeover bids, 2004 O.J. L 142/12 [hereinafter Takeover Directive]. 
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law on Golden Shares70 during the late 1990s made the need for a co-
herent takeover law appear more pressing,71 and the Takeover Di-
rective was also a centerpiece of the 1999 Financial Services Action 
Plan.72 
The final compromise can be considered to be watered-down ver-
sion of UK takeover law. In particular, the implementation of the man-
datory bid rule (Art 5 (1)) was obligatory for the Member States.73 
However, the deliberations over the Directive extended over many 
years until it was finally passed in 2004. In 2001 the European Parlia-
ment rejected a proposal by one vote after a number of heated debates.74 
There was a lot of resistance,75 particularly against the neutrality prin-
ciple, which ultimately was included only as a Member State option. 
Some of the fiercest resistance came from Germany76, whose represent-
atives were afraid that its corporations would become particularly ex-
posed to takeovers. The resulting compromise made the neutrality rule 
– as well as the little-used breakthrough rule – optional, and allowed 
                                                                                                             
70. See, e.g. Commission v. France, Case C-483/99, [2002] E.C.R. I-4785; Case C-503/99, 
Commission v. Belgium, Case C-503/99, [2002] E.C.R. I-4812 (only case upholding the national 
measure, which provided merely for a veto in specific circumstances); Commission v. Portugal, 
Case C-367/98, [2002] E.C.R. I-4756; see also Commission v. Germany, Case C-112/05, [2005] 
E.C.R. I-9020. 
71. Hopt, supra note 68, at 13-14. 
72. Commission of the European Communities, Implementing the Framework for Finan-
cial Markets: Action Plan, COM (1999) 232 final (May 1999). 
73. Luca Enriques, The Mandatory Bid Rule in the Takeover Directive: Harmonization 
Without Foundation?, 1 EUR. COMPANY & FIN. L. REV. 440, 443-44 (2004) (discussing the 
mandatory bid rule and Member States’ level of discretion in implementing it). 
74. See European Parliament Debate, Takeover bids (12 Dec. 2000) [hereinafter Takeover 
Directive Debates], http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=CRE&reference=
20001212&secondRef=ITEM-014&format=XML&language=EN. 
75. Moreover, the managements of leading German companies such as DaimlerChrysler, 
Volkswagen, and BASF opposed the Directive. JOHN W. CIOFFI, PUBLIC LAW AND PRIVATE 
POWER 162 (2010). 
76. See Peter Hommelhoff, Christoph Teichmann & Carl-Heinz Witt, Corporate and Busi-
ness Law in the European Union: Status and Perspectives 2004, in TOWARDS A EUROPEAN 
CIVIL CODE 814 (Arthur Hartkamp et al. eds., 2004); ANDREW JOHNSTON, EC REGULATION OF 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 278-280 (2009); id., at 161-167; DIGNAM & GALANIS, supra note 
16, at 335-336; GRUNDMANN, supra note 43, at 736. 
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Member States to make its application to any particular company con-
tingent on reciprocity.77 
For purposes of the symposium, a number of observations need to 
be made. First, while the UK law was clearly the model, its success was 
limited because of the extensive optionality arrangements. Second, the 
limitation is even more striking when one looks at the actual impact of 
the Directive. As Ventoruzzo points out, a considerable number of 
Member States had already, prior to the implementation of the Di-
rective, passed a UK-inspired takeover law.78 The effects in these Con-
tinental European countries were, however, often quite different be-
cause they generally had concentrated ownership structures.79 With 
concentrated ownership, the neutrality rule was largely irrelevant; a po-
tential bidder would need to persuade the significant shareholders of 
the firm to take control. Moreover, the mandatory bid rule has very 
different effects in a concentrated ownership system. In a dispersed 
ownership company, it will generally force the bidder to share the pri-
vate benefits of control with small investors by offering them a partic-
ular price. Under concentrated ownership, it will more frequently have 
the effect of inhibiting a takeover by making it too expensive to be vi-
able.80 Thus, UK-inspired takeover law tends to serve to entrench ex-
isting large shareholders in Continental Europe. Consequently, the 
adoption of UK-inspired rules most likely predominantly served the 
purpose of window-dressing and complying with a set of “best prac-
tices” considered good law, but without actually upsetting local struc-
tures of economic power. 
Third, it is not clear at first glance how well takeover law fits well 
into liberal capitalist model that supposedly relies on outside finance 
and capital markets. Notably, the United States has not espoused the 
UK model, in spite of arguably being even more reliant on financial 
                                                                                                             
77. I.e. a firm applying neutrality and reciprocity would be subject to the neutrality rule 
only when the hostile bidder itself is subject to neutrality. See Takeover Directive, supra note 
69, art. 12(3); Gatti, supra note 63, at 572-575. 
78. Marco Ventoruzzo, Takeover Regulation as a Wolf in Sheep’s Clothing: Taking U.K. 
Rules to Continental Europe, 11 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 135, 145-50 (2008). 
79. Supra note 17 and accompanying text. For a general analysis of how blockholders 
captures ostensibly investor-oriented corporate law reforms, see Fabio Bulfone, Insider job: cor-
porate reforms and power resources in France, Italy and Spain, 15 SOCIO-ECON. REV. 435-359 
(2017). 
80. Ventoruzzo, supra note 78, at 157. 
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markets than the United Kingdom. This first impression, however, is 
likely deceptive. Comparing the United States and United Kingdom 
corporate governance systems, the latter is, in a variety of ways, more 
shareholder-oriented than the former, at least in giving shareholders 
more control.81 US takeover law is more board-centric, as is US corpo-
rate law in general. Shareholder disempowerment is historically con-
nected to the corporate welfare state, where employers were (and still 
are) to a much larger extent responsible for workers’ health care and 
retirement savings than in the United Kingdom.82 The United Kingdom 
has historically left these functions to the government, which allowed 
corporate law to be more unambiguously shareholder-oriented. Over 
the past 30 years, US corporate governance has moved farther in the 
direction of shareholder orientation, but takeover law (and the rest of 
Delaware corporate law) remains a holdout of managerialism.83 When 
we look at corporate law only, the UK is clearly the most market-ori-
ented (or liberal). Takeover law, extracted to the Continent, does not 
provide a particularly good match, but should probably be seen as an 
isolated legal transplant in a host that is not fully receptive. 
B. Accounting: “True and fair view” and the (partial) victory of 
IFRS 
Accounting was another subject included in the EU company law 
harmonization project. The disclosure of financial information is quite 
obviously one of the areas affecting the interests of third parties inter-
                                                                                                             
81. See, e.g., ANDREAS CAHN & DAVID C. DONALD, COMPARATIVE COMPANY LAW 303 
(2010). 
82. See Christopher M. Bruner, Power and Purpose in the “Anglo-American” Corpora-
tion, 50 VA. J. INT’L L. 579 (2010); Martin Gelter, The Pension System and the Rise of Share-
holder Primacy, 43 SETON HALL L. REV. 909 (2013). 
83. Gelter, supra note 18, at 50-52 (describing the transition to shareholder-centrism as a 
practical rather than legal development). While the doctrine developed during the 1980s has 
remained firmly in place, arguably, the justification for the “substantive coercion” component 
of Unocal is much less strong than it once was, given that with a higher percentage of institu-
tional (as opposed to retail) investors it is becoming harder to see why the board would needed 
to protect shareholders from a substantively inadequate offer. See, e.g., Myron T. Steele, Lec-
ture: Continuity and Change in Delaware Corporate Law Jurisprudence, 20 FORDHAM J. CORP. 
& FIN. L. 352, 361-362 (2015) (former Delaware Chief Justice predicting that the Delaware 
courts will eventually abandon the doctrine). 
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acting with companies from various Member States. While the 1st Com-
pany law Directive already required all limited-liability entities to dis-
close a set of financial statements after an amendment in 1972,84 the 
harmonization of substantive accounting standards had to wait for the 
4th Directive (Accounting Directive) of 197885 and the 7th Directive 
(Group Accounting Directive) of 1983.86 The accession of the United 
Kingdom (alongside with Ireland and Denmark) in 1973 had a notice-
able impact on the development of these directives, since agreement on 
a number of issues required a greater number of compromises. While 
the earlier drafts for the directives had relied mainly on Continental, 
particularly German and French accounting traditions,87 the British tra-
dition influenced the final directives in many aspects. The most famous 
example is the “true and fair view” standard,88 which had its origins in 
                                                                                                             
84. First Council Directive, supra note 3. 
85. Fourth Council Directive of 25 July 1978 based on Article 54 (3) (g) of the Treaty on 
the annual accounts of certain types of companies, 1978 O.J. L 222/11 [hereinafter Fourth Di-
rective] (discussing the reasons for enacting the accounting standards). Regarding the relation-
ship between the First and Fourth Directive, see EDWARDS, supra note 43, at 118 (“The Fourth 
Directive has its roots in the discussions leading up to the First Directive . . . .”). 
86. Seventh Council Directive of 13 June 1983 based on the Article 54 (3) (g) of the Treaty 
on consolidated accounts, 1983 O.J. L 193/1. In 2013, both directive were integrated into a com-
bined Accounting Directive. Directive 2013/34/EU of the European Parliament and of the Coun-
cil of 26 June 2013 on the Annual Financial Statements, Consolidated Financial Statements and 
Related Reports of Certain Types of Undertakings, Amending Directive 2006/43/EC of the Eu-
ropean Parliament and of the Council and Repealing Council Directives 78/660/EEC and 
83/349/EEC, 2013 O.J. L 182/19 [hereinafter Accounting Directive]. 
87. Brigitte Eierle, Differential Reporting in Germany—A Historical Analysis, 15 ACCT. 
BUS. & FIN. HIST. 279, 290 (2005) (noting strong German influence on the Fourth Directive); 
EDWARDS, supra note 43, at 118–21 (discussing the Elemendorff report of 1966, the first pro-
posal of 1969, and the subsequent effect of the United Kingdom and other new Member States). 
88. Fourth Directive, supra note 85, at art. 2(3)–(6). 
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the Companies Act of 1948.89 While this lofty goal for financial state-
ments was relatively harmless, the so-called “overriding principle”90 
caused considerable controversy. Under this provision, reporting firms 
must, “in exceptional cases” depart from specific accounting rules 
where they would be incompatible with the “true and fair view” as de-
fined in the Directive. A number of Member States simply did not im-
plement this provision. In particular, Germany and Denmark did not 
include the provision, as well as later additions to the Union such as 
Austria, Sweden and Finland.91 Furthermore the significance of the 
provision has remained unclear in countries that implemented it as well, 
including France.92 
One reason for the resistance against “true and fair view” and 
other aspects of the European directives was that accounting was tradi-
tionally understood to have different purposes in Continental European 
than in the English-speaking world.93 Accounting profits were seen as 
limiting the distributions firms could make in the form of dividends, 
                                                                                                             
89. See Lawrence E. Cunningham, Semiotics, Hermeneutics, and Cash: An Essay on the 
True and Fair View, 28 N.C.J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 893, 904 (2003) (“[I]n Britain, the goal is 
producing financial statements giving a ‘true and fair view’ of business condition and results. 
These concepts . . . were utterly alien to non-Dutch Europe until the “true and fair” view was 
sanctioned by the Fourth Directive in 1978, driven by the United Kingdom’s recent admission 
to the European Union.”); see also Dieter Ordelheide, True and Fair View: A European and a 
German Perspective, 2 EUR. ACCT. REV. 81, 82 (1993) (describing how it was “Great Britain, 
which argued for bringing the true and fair view principle into Art. 2 of the Fourth Directive . . 
. .”); Jonathan Rickford, Legal Approaches to Restricting Distributions to Shareholders: Bal-
ance Sheet Tests and Solvency Tests, 7 EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 135, 147 (2006) (“At a relatively 
late stage in the negotiation of the [Fourth] Directive, the Anglo-Irish concept of the overriding 
principle of the ‘true and fair view’ . . . was added.”). 
90. Fourth Directive, supra note 84, Art. 2(5). 
91. David Alexander & Eva Eberhartinger, The True and Fair View in the European Un-
ion, 18 EUR. ACCT. REV. 571, 572 (2009); David Alexander & Eva Jermakowicz, A True and 
Fair View of the Principles/Rules Debate, 42 ABACUS 132, 139 (2006) (reporting that Germany, 
Austria and Sweden refused to implement the overriding principle); Cunningham, supra note 
89, at 910–11. Austria explicitly implemented the provision in 2015. See RECHNUNGSLEGUNGS-
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which is why they were often thought to be linked to the regulation of 
legal capital under the 2nd Directive.94 At least in the traditional view, 
this purpose trumped the goal of providing information to outside in-
vestors. Laws establishing accounting standards were thus often inter-
preted in light of the purpose of protecting creditors by limiting distri-
butions, thus mitigating in favor of a later realization of profits and 
casting distributions constraints as the primary purpose of financial 
statements95 that often even trumped the provision of useful infor-
mation.96 
Relatedly, book-tax conformity tends to be stronger in Continen-
tal Europe than in the Anglo-Saxon world.97 A close link between fi-
nancial accounting and taxation means that firms sometimes have to 
exercise accounting options in ways that have an impact on the provi-
sion of information if they want to minimize the tax load.98 In practice, 
sometimes tax purposes dominate financial reporting purposes.99 
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As a consequence of the attempt to reconcile several accounting 
cultures into a single harmonization project, the Fourth and Seventh 
Directive have often been considered a failure. They were frequently 
criticized for providing too many options to both the Member States 
and the reporting firms.100 In effect the Member States thus maintained 
accounting traditions.101 
Widespread dissatisfaction with Continental European accounting 
and European harmonization in the capital markets102 paved the way 
for the adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards 
(“IFRS”) for the consolidated accounts of publicly traded firms in the 
2002 IFRS Regulation, which came into effect in 2005.103 During the 
late 1990s and early 2000, a debate about convergence of corporate 
governance toward Anglo-American standards emerged, and the inter-
nationalization of accounting was very much part of it.104 The Interna-
tional Accounting Standards Board (“IASB”) – the body that develops 
IFRS – is of course based in London, but it is less well-known that the 
establishment of its predecessor body, the International Accounting 
Standards Committee (“IASC”), in 1973 was a reaction to EC account-
ing harmonization efforts. Fearing that the British accounting tradition 
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of private standard setting would be swept away by more statutory Con-
tinental approach,105 prominent British accountants took the lead in set-
ting up an international, private body that would eventually evolve in 
the world’s accounting standard setter.106 While representatives from 
many countries were involved from the beginning, IASC was domi-
nated by accountants socialized in the large accounting firms and im-
mersed in an Anglo-American accounting culture geared toward capital 
markets.107 
With the IFRS regulation, an Anglo-American accounting culture 
has won in the European Union, at least on a superficial level. Many 
Member States continue to require or permit their national accounting 
laws and standards to be used by non-listed firms and in the individual 
accounts of all firms.108 But in the stock markets IFRS have become de 
rigeur. It would be wrong to say, however, that the United Kingdom 
pushed for the IFRS Regulation in the European Union. In fact, the 
pressure came from large firms themselves that increasingly sought to 
avail themselves of stock markets, for which purpose IFRS and US 
generally accepted accounting principles (“GAAP”) are the financial 
linguae francae. However, we can say that the UK’s passive resistance 
to Continental-dominated harmonization, both by requiring compro-
mises in the directives and by setting up IASC, sowed the seed from 
which the tree of Anglo-Saxon style financial reporting in the European 
Union ultimately grew. With or without the United Kingdom in the 
Union, the wheel will not be turned back on accounting. 
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C. Corporate Governance geared to capital markets: The irrelevance 
of UK membership 
As we have seen, the UK model has achieved dominance relating 
to takeovers and accounting, with pockets of resistance remaining, even 
if the United Kingdom did not necessarily promote the export of its 
model to the Continent itself. For purposes of the symposium, this 
raises two questions. First, did it matter that the United Kingdom was 
an EU member? In other words, would the law have developed simi-
larly without the United Kingdom? Second, is the departure of the 
United Kingdom from the European Union likely to result in any 
change? 
In both cases, the answer is no. Countries that modeled their take-
over law on the UK’s did so in part before being required to do so by 
the European Union, while others managed to use the directive’s op-
tional arrangement to avoid it (e.g. Germany with respect to takeover 
defenses). Similarly, in the late 1990s, some Member States were al-
ready beginning to permit their publicly traded firms to use US GAAP 
and IFRS,109 even if the compatibility of these standards with the direc-
tives was questionable. In the case of takeover law, Member States 
claimed that they wanted to improve their capital markets.110 In the case 
of accounting, firms seeking access to international markets were put-
ting pressure on their governments.111 The United Kingdom became the 
most frequently imitated jurisdiction in corporate law not because it 
was an EU Member and it influenced EU law to conform to its own 
standard. Rather, as the leading capital market it was increasingly seen 
as a paragon of good corporate governance during this period, which is 
why other countries (within and outside of the European Union) saw it 
                                                                                                             
109. E.g. HGB (Ger.) § 292a (1998), as introduced by the GESETZ ZUR VERBESSERUNG 
DER WETTBEWERBSFÄHIGKEIT DEUTSCHER KONZERNE AN KAPITALMÄRKTEN UND ZUR 
ERLEICHTERUNG DER AUFNAHME VON GESELLSCHAFTERDARLEHEN 
(KAPITALAUFNAHMEERLEICHTERUNGSGESETZ – KAPAEG), April 20, 1998, BGBL I S. 707. 
See also Eierle, supra note 87, at 291-292; GRUNDMANN, supra note 43, at 427 n.14. 
110. See Ventoruzzo, supra note 49; Takeover Directive Debates, supra note 74. 
111. See Gelter & Kavame Eroglu, supra note 108, at 150. 
2017] UK'S INFLUENCE ON EU COMPANY LAW 1439 
as a model to emulate, in particular with a view to the ascendant share-
holder primacy paradigm.112 Corporate governance codes are a similar 
example: The UK model of the “Combined Code” was adopted every-
where in Europe in the late 1990s and early 2000s, without any pressure 
from the European Union.113 Adoption of all of these elements should 
rather be seen as an element of a general convergence trend in corporate 
governance at that time. 
While the shareholder corporate governance model may have lost 
some of its sparkle since the financial crisis, the reforms are here to 
stay. There is no movement to abandon them, given that they ultimately 
have not turned out to be particularly burdensome on any relevant in-
terest group. If a decision is made to amend any of these legal instru-
ments in the future to move away from the UK-inspired requirements, 
it will not matter much whether the United Kingdom is an European 
union member or not; the Member States would need to see a strong 
need for change. 
V. CONCLUSION: BRINGING BACK THE OLD WAY 
We have seen two countervailing trends in the relationship be-
tween the United Kingdom and the European Union in company law, 
which can be summarized under the headings of “importance” and “ir-
relevance.” It is possible that both reflect individualistic economic 
tendencies inherent in the UK’s particular variety of capitalism. 
The United Kingdom was important for issues not directly related 
to capital markets, in particular board structure and legal capital. While 
we can see the United Kingdom’s handwriting in EU Company Law, it 
mainly served as a roadblock against harmonization along German 
lines. True, not every element of German corporate law would have 
found the approval of a majority of the other Continental Member 
                                                                                                             
112. E.g. MATHIAS M. SIEMS, CONVERGENCE IN SHAREHOLDER LAW 56-59 (2008); Ruth 
V. Aguilera & Alvaro Cuervo-Cazurra, Codes of Good Governance, 17 CORP. GOV. 376, 377-
379 (2009). 
113. Only later was the Accounting Directive amended to require a disclosure whether a 
company adhered to a code. Directive 2006/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Coun-
cil of 14 June 2006 amending Council Directives 78/660/EEC on the annual accounts of certain 
types of companies, 83/349/EEC on consolidated accounts, 86/635/EEC on the annual accounts 
and consolidated accounts of banks and other financial institutions and 91/674/EEC on the an-
nual accounts and consolidated accounts of insurance undertakings, 2006 O.J. L 224/1 (intro-
ducing art. 46a regarding corporate governance codes into the Fourth Directive). The successor 
provision is article 20 of the recast Accounting Directive. Accounting Directive, supra note 86, 
art. 20. 
1440 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 40:5 
States, but at least on the margins harmonization would have been more 
likely. The United Kingdom, with its tradition of not quite rugged, but 
civilized individualism favored free choice by companies and the indi-
viduals founding them and planning their structure. A mandatory two-
tier system and a supervisory board soiled with Union influence would 
have been unacceptable to a Thatcherite and post-Thatcherite Britain, 
as would have been the impediment to entrepreneurship created by an 
expanded legal capital scheme. 
Counterintuitively, the UK’s membership in the EU can be de-
scribed as irrelevant for harmonization in areas related capital markets. 
In these fields of law, the United Kingdom tends to favor informed in-
vestors able to avail themselves of transparent accounting information, 
who are treated fairly in takeover law relative to the sellers of control-
ling blocks, and who do not need management to tell them whether to 
accept a takeover bid or not. Consequently, in these areas the UK model 
actually sometimes endorses mandatory law as long as it advances the 
interests of informed shareholders making investment decisions. Thus, 
the United Kingdom came to be seen as the model jurisdiction of good 
corporate governance during the 1990s and 2000s. Of course, speculat-
ing about a counterfactual history, we cannot know if United Kingdom 
had solidified its position as a leading capital market without EU mem-
bership. Given the long history of UK markets, it is likely that it would 
have found a way. Thus, even without EU membership, it might have 
achieved this position, and European harmonization might have fol-
lowed suit. Thus, we can probably say that the UK’s membership was 
likely irrelevant for the development of company law in this area, given 
that market forces would pushed the Union into the same direction. 
In light of this assessment, if the United Kingdom returns to the 
old way of “splendid isolation” and “divide and rule” by abandoning 
the Union, will it have an impact on either area of EU company law? 
Most likely not. While capital markets no longer shine as they did 
twenty years ago, we will not go back to the post-war decades when 
Continental European markets largely lay dormant. Even after the fi-
nancial crisis has eroded the confidence in “good corporate govern-
ance,” Europe is unlikely to retreat from transparent accounting and 
takeover law. If anything, the plans set forth by the commission, such 
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as the 2012 Action Plan114 and the 2017 amendments to the Shareholder 
Rights Directive,115 continue the trajectory of the past two decades. 
Traditional continental harmonization projects – related to issues such 
as board structure and capital – are unlikely to relaunch. 
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